Chromatic · loyal

Color-team review

Loyal · LOYAL-003 · passed

Coverage: forensics no · market yes · snapshot yes. Confidence: medium. Availability: partial. Snapshot freshness: 31 July 2026 (18d, stale).

Ask size is independent of attack-vector indicators. Flip-cost dollars appear only when already published.

Request $182K
Treasury share unknown

Roster readout

Six bounded teams, one shared evidence layer. Each finding stays in its lane; there is no composite score, and withheld lanes stay withheld.

Pink TeamEvidence
Evidence packet incomplete

Missing wallet forensics · availability partial. Gaps stay visible; nothing is assumed.

withheld
Red TeamAttack
Classification withheld — UNSCORED

Required forensic fields are absent, so no vector is matched and nothing is asserted.

withheld
Blue TeamMarket
Passed — pass edge +2.50% vs +1.50% threshold

Volume ~74% pass-aligned / ~26% fail-aligned. Market outcome and forensic match stay separate.

complete
Yellow TeamPlaybooks
4 monitored playbooks · 2 documented

Withheld [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] — evidence incomplete, so those detectors did not run. Each classification stays scoped to its own evidence packet.

standing
Purple TeamLearning
Standing checks applied

Lessons from published cases run here as versioned checks; this record adds no new case study.

standing
White TeamClaims
Nothing is asserted

Withheld states are not scores and never render as low risk.

standing
Treasury (31 July 2026)
$339,075
Spot
$0.1050
NAV/AS
$0.1300
Prem / disc
-16.40%
Pass edge vs threshold
+2.50% vs +1.50%
Cleared pass threshold
1.00%
Treasury request
$182K
Proposal outcome
Passed
Volume tilt
pass-aligned

Pass / fail market math

Published pass edge versus the published pass threshold. Figures are a labeled normalized index (base 1.000), not observed dollar TWAPs.

pass edge vs threshold

+2.50% vs +1.50%

Net Pass Volume Tilt = [(PassBuy + FailSell) − (PassSell + FailBuy)] / vol

0.4800 · ~74% pass-aligned / ~26% fail-aligned

Economic attack indicators

Each classification is scoped to one monitored vector. Indicators are never added across vectors. A no-match is not a LOW or safe assessment.

Recycled-stake treasury extraction · [email protected] · Economic governance attack

A proposer acquires the required stake, rapidly recovers and reuses it in the decision market, with wallet-funding and execution behavior providing supporting evidence.

This classification is scoped to one monitored attack vector, not a validated composite proposal-risk score or a complete claim of safety.

Economic attack indicators are unavailable. Vector classification is withheld.

Late-window TWAP outcome steering · [email protected] · Decision-market manipulation

A trader waits out most of the TWAP window, then pushes a marginal print across its threshold in the closing stretch — when the required move is fully known and defenders have the least accrual time left to trade the price back. Late trades carry the least time-weight, so the target is a market already near its threshold, not the TWAP itself. Late activity also has benign forms — organic close-out and activist pressure — so a detector must separate steering from ordinary end-of-window trading.

This classification is scoped to one monitored attack vector, not a validated composite proposal-risk score or a complete claim of safety.

Economic attack indicators are unavailable. Vector classification is withheld.

Wash-volume alignment inflation · [email protected] · Decision-market manipulation

Automated near-neutral flow inflates a market's apparent volume and economic alignment, dressing thin conviction up as broad support while contributing no real position either way. The same fingerprint matches benign arbitrage flow, which published analysis strips as routine; a detector must separate deliberate wash from ordinary arb before it can say anything.

This classification is scoped to one monitored attack vector, not a validated composite proposal-risk score or a complete claim of safety.

Economic attack indicators are unavailable. Vector classification is withheld.

Coordinated multi-wallet stake assembly · [email protected] · Economic governance attack

An operator splits stake acquisition or market activity across coordinated wallets so no single address crosses the eligibility thresholds the protocol enforces or the attribution thresholds a reviewer watches. Coordination alone is not an attack — multi-wallet holders and coordinated defenders share parts of this shape — so the mechanism is the threshold evasion, not the wallet count.

This classification is scoped to one monitored attack vector, not a validated composite proposal-risk score or a complete claim of safety.

Economic attack indicators are unavailable. Vector classification is withheld.

Sources: 01Resolved, Ownership Coin Monthly, July 2026, as of 31 July 2026.

Back to proposal cases